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THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE/ 
THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, an 
independent agency of the State of 
Utah, GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 880511-CA 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINTS OF FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
BY COURT OF APPEALS 
The points of fact overlooked or misapprehended by the Court 
of Appeals are as follows: 
1. There is no evidence or substantial evidence to support 
the Court's conclusion that the Utah State Retirement Office 
distributed two flyers, (see Court's Opinion, first paragraph page 
two) In connection herewith, there is no evidence to support the 
conclusion that the second flier entitled "Employees Group 
Insurance Bulletin", allegedly dated June 20, 1978 was ever 
distributed to the American Fork Training School state employees. 
2. There is no evidence or substantial evidence to support 
the Courtfs conclusion that notice of or knowledge of the effective 
date of the proposed new life insurance program was ever made known 
to the state employees at the American Fork Training School during 
the enrollment period (which ended June 30, 1978). 
3. There is no evidence or substantial evidence to support 
the Court's erroneous conclusion that the alleged second flyer, 
dated June 20, 1978, was "routinely circulated to state employees 
in their paychecks." In this connection, there is absolutely no 
evidence to support the contention that the alleged second flyer 
was ever obtained by the American Fork Training School 
Representative who came to Salt Lake to pick up the paychecks, let 
alone any evidence to support the contention or conclusion that the 
second flyer was ever distributed. 
4. The conclusion of the Court in the third paragraph, page 
two of the opinion is unclear as to the interpretation of the Blue 
Brochure, however, a finding by the Appellate Court that Blue 
Brochure was "not ambiguous" does not ipso facto lead to the 
conclusion that a state employee could ascertain therefrom the 
effective date of the new insurance coverage (certainly not a 
specific inception date of July 16, 1978). 
POINTS OF LAW OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
BY THE APPELLATE COURT 
5. The Kloepfer v. Continental Assurance Company case is 
not factually similar to the Thelma Johnson case, except in the 
sole respect that both are group insurance cases. There, the 
similarity ends. 
6. Without the alleged "second flyer dated June 20, 1978," 
there is no evidence from which the Court can conclude as a matter 
of law that there was any specific effective date other than what 
may be implied from the ordinary person's understanding of the 
language of the Blue Brochure. 
7. The evidence before the Court in the form of affidavits 
submitted by Plaintiff and affidavits submitted by Defendants can 
lead to one of only two possible conclusions: (1) that the alleged 
"second flyer" was never distributed; or (2) that there exists a 
genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of 
and/or distribution of the alleged "second flyer," in which case 
the matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for the purpose 
of an evidentiary hearing, at least on that point. It is 
impossible to conclude from a reading of the ten affidavits that 
any evidence or substantial evidence exists in favor of the 




No Evidence of Second Flyer 
1. The Court has incorrectly and erroneously concluded that 
there were two flyers. The Court has erroneously concluded that 
the flyer entitled "Employee's Group Insurance Bulletin", allegedly 
dated June 20, 1978 was distributed to the American Fork Training 
School State Employees. There is not one scintilla of evidence in 
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the Court file supporting this conclusion. Even the Defendants 
admit in their joint "Motion for Summary Disposition" on appeal as 
follows: 
Appellant claims that a contested fact is whether or not 
her decedent ever received the group insurance bulletin 
(Ex. C) [the alleged second flyer] and indeed there is 
no proof that he did, (see p. 6 therein) [emphasis added] 
The best and most persuasive evidence in the Court file is the 
Affidavit of Dave Pearson of the Utah State Insurance 
Commissioner's Office dated February 12, 1987. In paragraph 4 
therein he states: 
Upon employment in this office on November 3, 1969, I 
set up a file into which I deposited insurance items or 
other medical related items. When the issue arose in 
this lawsuit, I remembered that I had such a slip and 
retrieved it on the spot to find that the date was indeed 
July 1, 1978. I not only distinctly remember receiving 
the Blue Brochure together with the blue enrollment card 
and payroll deduction authorization form, but further 
state that I have nothing else in my file, and that I, 
to the best of my recollection, never received any other 
white sheet or bulletin or other notice of any kind 
informing me that there was any other date for the 
commencement of the Gem State Life Insurance than the 
date contained in the Blue Bulletin, which date was July 
1, 1978. 
2. Further, the Affidavit of Melba Hatfield dated February 
11, 1987 states in pertinent part: 
I distinctly recall receiving a small Blue Brochure or 
pamphlet together with a small blue enrollment card and 
payroll deduction authorization form in the spring of 
1978. A copy of said Brochure is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A...I received no other written or oral notice 
from any source that the insurance coverage offered in 
the Blue Brochure would begin or commence on any date 
other than the date in the brochure which was July 1, 
1978. 
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3. The Affidavit of Bryant Johnson states as follows: 
During the spring and summer of 1978 I was employed as 
Program Director at the American Fork Training School, 
and as a state employee. I remember distinctly receiving 
the Blue Brochure.. . I know for a fact that my father, the 
deceased, Douglas Johnson, filled out the enrollment card 
and payroll deduction authorization and timely filed it 
with the State of Utah through the Retirement Board. I 
had conversations, not only with my father and mother, 
but with other state employees at the time. All of us 
understood the Blue Brochure containing the date of July 
1, 1978 to mean that if the enrollment card was filed 
with the state prior to July 1, 1978, that the life 
insurance amount enrolled for with Gem State would 
commence or become effective on the date of July L, 1978. 
No other date was contained in the Blue Brochure or any 
information which I received from the state. I was 
unaware at the time of any other written or oral notice 
of any other alleged effective date for the Gem State 
insurance to commence, and from my conversations with 
others, was unaware that anyone had been notified of any 
other effective date for the insurance other than July 
1, 1978. 
4. From the above quotes, and others contained in the 
Affidavits filed in support of the Plaintiff's claim, it is clear 
that there was no distribution of a June 20, 1978 "Employees Group 
Insurance Bulletin." All of these Affidavits are based on personal 
knowledge and not upon beliefs and speculations. 
5. In contrast to the direct affidavit evidence offered by 
the Plaintiff, the Defendants submitted Affidavits which were 
conjectural and speculative, and which were submitted by people 
who were neither present at the American Fork Training School, nor 
involved directly in any way with the alleged distribution of the 
July 20, 1978 bulletin, or dealt with other non-related matters. 
For instance, the Affidavits of Ray S. George, Clara Moss, and 
Patricia A. Myers make no mention of the alleged second flyer. The 
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only other affidavit submitted by the Defendants was that of Lynn 
Baker, who testified by affidavit only as to general procedures. 
There is no direct affidavit testimony in the affidavit of Lynn 
Baker wherein he states that he had any personal knowledge that the 
alleged second flyer or bulletin was ever actually distributed to 
the American Fork Training School. He spoke only in terms of what 
"would have happened". 
6. In short, there is absolutely no positive proof of any 
kind that the alleged second flyer was ever distributed to the 
American Fork Training School employees, rather, to the contrary, 
the actual eye witness, first-hand-knowledge testimony comes from 
the state employee affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff proving 
that there was no distribution of the said bulletin. 
7. At the very least, the Court must conclude that this is 
a contested issue of fact, and remand the matter back to the Trial 
Court for the taking of evidence and a proper determination. The 
only other possible conclusion which could be reached is one which 
believes the Plaintiff's affidavits and concludes that there was 
no distribution of the second flyer allegedly dated June 20, 1978. 
How can this appelate Court conclude as the touchstone fact in its 
decision that the alleged second flyer existed and was distributed 
when such a conclusion is contrary to the evidence and the 
admissions of the Defendants? 
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POINT TWO 
State Employees Had No 
Knowledge of the Effective Date 
8. Absent proof showing an actual distribution of the June 
20, 1978 bulletin to the American Fork Training School, there is 
no evidence in the Court file to support any contention that the 
state employees there had any knowledge of the effective date of 
the new Gem State Life Insurance program (see the arguments under 
Point one). 
POINT THREE 
No Evidence That Second Flyer was 
Routinely Circulated in Paychecks 
9. The Court, in it's Opinion, stated that the second flyer 
was "routinely circulated to state employees in their paychecks." 
It seems clear from the language used by the Court--"in their 
paychecks"— that the Appellate Court has the impression or 
misapprehension that the paychecks were somehow put in envelopes 
and that the flyers were put in the envelopes with the paychecks. 
This is not how the paychecks and any other flyers or information 
was distributed to the American Fork Training School employees in 
1978. 
The distribution of paychecks in 1978 at the American Fork 
Training School was, at best, a helter skelter, somewhat 
disorganized approach. A representative would pick up the 
paychecks from the payroll department at the State Capital and 
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would set them on a table in the cafeteria at the American Fork 
Training School. Employees would simply file by the table and 
would be handed their paycheck, which was not in an envelope. All 
the checks were simply in a large stack or pile. If there were 
other flyers or information, they were in a stack on another table 
or at a different point at the cafeteria, and sometimes they 
weren't anywhere. There was no rhyme or reason or organization to 
the distribution, and there is absolutely no evidence before the 
Appellate Court to prove that the June 20, 1978 bulletin was ever 
even distributed through this helter skelter process in June of 
1978 at the American Fork Training School. 
Again, if this is assumed to be a fact by the Appellate Court, 
it should be noted that there is no evidence to support that 
assumption, and that the Plaintiff strongly contests the fact of 
the distribution, and therefore the matter should be remanded to 
the Trial Court for the taking of evidence. 
POINT FOUR 
Ambiguity of Blue Brochure 
10. This Appellate Court has failed to make any analysis of 
the contract elements concerning the offer and acceptance which 
was effected during the enrollment period and prior to the 
existence of the Master Policy. Absent the proof of the existence 
or distribution of the second flyer, allegedly dated June 20, 1978, 
an issue arises which has not been resolved by the Appellate Court. 
In spite of the finding of the Appellate Court that the language 
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in the Blue Brochure is "not ambiguous", it does not follow that, 
absent the second flyer, the state employee had any notice or 
knowledge of the effective date of the insurance other than the 
implied date of July 1, 1978, A finding that the Blue Brochure was 
"not ambiguous" does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that a 
state employee could ascertain therefrom the effective date of the 
new insurance coverage, and certainly not the specific alleged 
inception date of July 16, 1978. The effective date must be 
construed in favor of insurance coverage under such a circumstance. 
POINTS FIVE, SIX AND SEVEN 
Kloepfer case not factually similar 
Absent proof of second flyer— 
no basis to conclude July 16th effective date 
Affidavits 
11. The Kloepfer vs. Continental Assurance Co., 23 Ut.2d 178, 
460 P.2d 337 (1969), is not factually similar to the Thelma Johnson 
case, except in the sole respect that both are group insurance 
cases. 
12. An analysis and comparison of the two cases discloses 
that there are fourteen factual differences between the Kloepfer 
case and the Johnson case, and only one similarity (See Exhibit A 
attached hereto). 
13. As can be seen clearly from Exhibit A, every single 
factual element of the Kloepfer case and the Johnson case are 
different or opposite, with the sole exception that they are both 
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Group Life Insurance policies. The conclusion of the Appellate 
Court that the cases are factually similar is erroneous and wrong. 
The Thelma Johnson case is a case of first impression in the State 
of Utah. 
14. Furthermore, the Appellate Court's conclusion that the 
Davison v. Business Men's Assurance Co. 85 NM 796, 518 P.2d 776 
(1974) case is factually similar is equally erroneous. A careful 
reading of that case discloses that it is similar to the Kloepfer 
case in it's factual elements, including but not limited to the 
fact that meetings were held with county employees in which the 
effective dates for proposed applicants were disclosed in advance; 
evidence of insurability was required; an advance application or 
request for insurance was required from each prospective insured; 
and the Master Policy, which existed in advance of those meetings, 
contained provisions allowing for the calculation of the effective 
dates. The Davison case has one fact which is similar to the 
Johnson case, which is that a payroll deduction form was apparently 
submitted by the prospective enrollee. However, Davidson was also 
required to submit a request for insurance and the insurance 
company was required to find the proof of insurability submitted 
by Davison as satisfactory. None of those other facts are similar 
to the Johnson case at bar. 
15. In contrast to the comparison between the Kloepfer and 
Johnson cases, supra, a careful factual comparison between the 
Gladden case, infra, and the Johnson case at bar will show that 
the case most factually similar to the Johnson case is indeed the 
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Gladden case, which was presented to the Trial Court and to the 
Appellate Court in Plaintiff's Briefe (See Exhibit B attached 
hereto.) 
16. As can be seen from the factual comparison between the 
Gladden and Johnson cases (Exhibit B) , the Johnson case is very 
similar factually to the Gladden case. Since the Johnson case is 
a case of first impression in Utah — that assertion is made based 
upon the fact that none of the litigants in the case at bar have 
presented any case, besides Gladden, which is factually similar to 
the Johnson case, and none of the parties have been able to find 
or advance to the Court any Utah case which is factually similar 
to the Johnson case — the Court must look to a non-Utah case in 
order to find a proper resolution for the Johnson case. That case 
is Gladden, supra. 
In resolving the Gladden case, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals engaged in an analysis of contract law, which analysis is 
necessary in order to properly resolve the Johnson case. The 
analysis was one of contract law elements in which the Fourth 
Circuit Court analyzed the fact that in Gladden there was an offer 
of insurance, an acceptance by the enrol lee under conditions where 
the enrollee was never allowed or given the opportunity to see the 
Master Policy. Each of those facts and all of the facts set forth 
in the factual comparison chart (Exhibit B) demonstate enormous 
similarities between the Gladden case and the Johnson case. This 
Appellate Court glossed over and failed to make any analysis of the 
offer and acceptance and other contract elements in order to arrive 
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at an answer to the ultimate issue in this lawsuit, which concerns 
itself with the question of the effective date. It is insufficient 
and erroneous to simply conclude that there was a second flier and 
therefore the effective date was July 16, 1978. There is a glaring 
and obvious dispute of a material fact concerning the existence and 
distribution of the second flyer. That matter should be remanded 
to the Trial Court. The only other possible resolution would have 
to be in favor of Thelma Johnson. With that in mind, it cannot be 
concluded that the enrollees during the enrollment period had any 
knowledge of or any notice of the effective date of the proposed 
insurance, except the implied effective date of July 1, 1978 
contained in the Blue Brochure. Therefore, it is inappropriate to 
simply conclude, without analysis, as this Court did in it!s 
Opinion, that the effective date is July 16, 1978. 
17. The glaring issue, not adequately addressed by the 
Appellate Court, is "when was the coverage effective on the life 
of Douglas Johnson." In comparing the Johnson case to the Kloepfer 
case, supra and the Davison case, supra, one glaring difference is 
immediately obvious. In both the Kloepfer and Davison cases the 
Master Policy existed prior to the date of application by the 
prospective insureds, and the effective date and/or the method of 
calculating the effective date was disclosed to the insureds in 
advance of their making application for insurance. None of these 
facts are similar to the Johnson case. 
18. In the Johnson case at bar, the Master Policy did not 
exist during the enrollment period. The effective date was unknown 
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and not disclosed to any of the state employees prior to the end 
of the enrollment period (the Defendents have presented no 
credible, believable evidence rebutting the Plaintiff's evidence 
that no second flyer existed or was distributed to the American 
Fork Training School employees). 
IN CONCLUSION: The case analysis and comparison by the 
Appellate Court in the Johnson case at bar is erroneous and wrong. 
It improperly finds as similar cases whose facts are entirely 
different and even opposite the facts of the Johnson case. The 
only factually similar case which has been presented to the Trial 
Court and the Appellate Court is the case of Gladden v. Pargas, 
Inc. of Waldorf Maryland v. The Hartford Life and Accident 
Insurance Co., 575 F.2d 1091 (1978). The Kloepfer case has one 
similarity (it's a Group policy) and eleven factual differences. 
In contradistinction to that, the Gladden case has only one 
difference (it's a Disability Group policy rather than a Life Group 
policy) and fourteen factual similarities. It is overwhelmingly 
evident from a review of the facts in each of the above-cited cases 
that the Thelma Johnson case at bar is most similar to the Gladden 
case, supra, and the resolution of the Thelma Johnson case should 
mirror or reflect the conclusion of the Gladden case, which was 
that the employee was covered by the group insurance, and is 
entitled to the benefits of the policy coverage. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^  day of September, 1989. 
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ARRDN F. JEPSON/' 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant/Petitioner 
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EXHIBIT A 
KLOEPFER CASE THELMA JOHNSON CASE 
Group Life policy 
Similarities 
Group Life policy 
Differences 
Required application on 
company form 
Applicant must submit evidence 
of insurability 
Insurance company had to 
determine whether submitted 
evidence of insurability was 
satisfactory 
Insurance company sent Notice 
of Acceptance to applicant 
with notice of inception or 
effective date 
Effective date disclosed to 
application in advance and was 
mathmatically calculable or 
certain at time of application 
Master Policy issued 1 1/2 
years before Kloepfer made 
application for insurance 
Premium payment required with 
application (no credit) 
Existing Master Policy 
provided computation basis for 
effective date (available for 
inspection and terms disclosed 
to applicant in advance of 
application) 
No "application" form 
Open enrollment (no evidence 
of insurability required) 
Open enrollment (automatic 
acceptance of all enrollees 
No notice of effective date 
given; no notice of acceptance 
required from insurance 
company 
Effective date unknown during 
enrollment period (implied 
date of July 1, 1978 was known 
from Blue Brochure) 
Master Policy did not exist 
during enrollment period 
Credit extended by insurance 
company with offer of 
insurance (no advanced 
preimium payment required) 
Master Policy non-existent 
during enrollment period and 
terms of Master Policy and 
effective date NOT disclosed 
to prospective enrollees. 
Consideration was advanced 
premium payment 
No offer of insurance or 
solicitation 
Only two parties-—insurance 
company and employee 
Consideration was payroll 
deduction authorization and 
continued employment (i.e„, 
Johnson continued employment 
after enrolling on June 9, 
1978) 
Gem State offered and 
solicitated enrollees with 
Blue Brochure 
Three parties—insurance 
company, employer (Retirement 
Board, so named in Master 






Enrollment form signed and 
submitted by employee 
Employee never given 
opportunity to receive or see 
copy of Master Policy 
After enrollment premiums 
deducted from pay 
Enrollment form and brochure 
was offer of insurance company 
to employee 
Plaintiff accepted offer with 
his signature on the 
enrollment form 
No application required 
No proof of insurability 
required 
Insurance company did not have 
to determine satisfaction of 
proof of insurability 
No notice of acceptance 
required from insurance 
company 
Credit theory part of offer 
(i.e., payroll deduction 
authorized by signature on 
enrollment card) 
No advanced premium payment 
required at time of enrollment 
Consideration was payroll 
deduction authorization and 
continued employment 
THELMA JOHNSON CASE 
ities 
Group Policy 
Enrollment form signed and 
submitted by employee 
Employee never given 
opportunity to receive or see 
copy of Master Policy (it did 
not exist) 
After enrollment premiums 
deducted from pay 
Enrollment form and brochure 
was offer of insurance company 
to employee (Blue Brochure 
with tear off enrollment form) 
Plaintiff's decedent accepted 
offer with his signature on 
the enrollment form 
No application required 
No proof of insurability 
required 
Insurance company did not have 
to determine satisfaction of 
proof of insurability 
No notice of acceptance 
required from insurance 
company 
Credit theory part of offer 
(i.e., payroll deduction 
authorized by signature on 
enrollment card) 
No advanced premium payment 
required at time of enrollment 
Consideration was payroll 




employer, and employee 
Group coverage was disability 
(not a relevant difference 
from the Johnson case) 
Three parties/entities 
involved—insurance company, 
employer, and employee 
Group coverage was life 
Differences 
